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A product recall can be viewed as a ﬁrm’s worst nightmare. Although the long-term damage to brand
equity and company reputation may be difﬁcult, if not impossible, to quantify, the short-term impact
on shareholders’ wealth is readily estimable. While many studies have examined this issue in the
Western context, little is known about the ﬁnancial impact of a product recall announcement in China.
To advance the knowledge about the ﬁnancial impact of a product recall announcement, we explore
this issue using event study methodology. In general, our ﬁndings are congruent with previous research
that product recalls result in negative abnormal returns. Interestingly, however, we found that Chinese
companies suffered from greater ﬁnancial losses than their Western counterparts did. This study also
provides evidence that the Chinese food industry experiences a more severe stock market reaction than
the automobile industry and that a passive recall strategy was associated with a more negative stock
market reaction than a proactive recall strategy. We conclude with several future research avenues for
global research on product recalls.
& 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The recent surge in product recalls of Chinese-made products has
attracted substantial attention from government and academia, due
to their danger to consumers. In Europe, 50% of the product risk
notiﬁcations in 2005 were related to products from China (European
Commission 2005). Statistics announced by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission of the US (2007) (www.mondag.com/article.
asp?articleid=57594) show that 67% of all product recalls came
from Chinese-manufactured products. Thus, product safety in China
has become a knotty issue that awaits disposition. For the ﬁrst time,
food and drug safety issues were the topic of Chinese government
report in 2009, pointing out that ‘‘The government will implement
strict market access rules and product traceability and recall
systems so that the people buy food and drugs with conﬁdence
and consume themwith satisfaction.’’ (Wen, 2009). The ‘‘Food Safety
Law of the People’s Republic of China’’ has been in effect since June
1, 2009, emphasizing inspection for food safety in all tiers, from farm
to fork. This action signiﬁes that the Chinese government has
decided to pay close attention to product safety issues and thus
places substantial value on the enhancement of product quality.
A product recall is an example of a product-harm crisis, which is
deﬁned as a ‘‘discrete, well-publicized occurrence wherein productsll rights reserved.
x: þ86 20 22236282.are found to be defective or dangerous (Dawar and Pillutla, 2000,
pg. 215)’’. Product harm crises have been increasing in frequency,
which has been attributed to globalization, increasing complexity of
products and higher consumer demand, as well as more stringent
product safety legislation (Dawar and Pillutla, 2000; Karipidis,
2011). Product harm crises and subsequent product recalls are
‘‘among a ﬁrm’s worst nightmares (Heerde et al., 2007, p. 230),’’
because they cause consumer panic and are very costly, as seen in
the recent case of the Sanlu group, which was at the center of
the Chinese melamine-tainted milk powder crisis, which ﬁled for
bankruptcy proceedings due to the mounting health liability claims
associated with its defective milk powder. Product recalls cannot
only ruin carefully cultivated brand equity and tarnish a company’s
reputation, but they can also result in major revenue and market-
share losses (Chen et al., 2009).
Although estimating the long-term damage of product recalls
on brand equity and company reputation is difﬁcult, if not
impossible, the short-term impact on shareholder wealth is
nevertheless estimable through the use of event study methodol-
ogy. The underpinnings of event study methodology state that, in
an efﬁcient market, the ﬁnancial impact of an unanticipated event
will be immediately reﬂected in stock prices (Fama, 1970). Since a
product recall is an important unanticipated economic event, the
study of the shareholder wealth effect of product recalls provides
a good understanding of the efﬁciency of stock markets (Pruitt
and Peterson, 1986). While there is a substantial body of research
which has discussed and examined the short-term impact of a
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and Peltzman, 1985; Pruitt and Peterson, 1986; Hoffer et al., 1988;
Bromiley and Marcus, 1989; Davidson and Worrell, 1992; Thomsen
and McKenzie, 2001; Govindaraj et al., 2004; Chu et al., 2005;
Cheah et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009), mostly providing evidence in
support of the efﬁcient market hypothesis, little is known about the
impact of a product recall announcement in the Chinese stock
market. This is important because of China’s emerging economy.
Many consumer products and components are produced in supply
chains that extend through emerging economies, thus this topic has
implications in China, as well as in the developed world. In addition,
the number of consumers in China is very large, and developing a
better understanding of their reaction to recall announcements
contributes to the study of supply chain quality. Furthermore, if a
company does experience a product-harm crisis and subsequent
recall, it is important to effectively craft a recall strategy to mitigate
the potential negative effects.
In order to advance the knowledge about the impact of product
recalls in China, we investigated the stock market reaction to a
product recall announcement, based on publicly listed companies in
China. We used event study methodology and compared our
ﬁndings with those from previous studies that examined publicly
listed companies in Western stock markets. We also examined the
companies’ posture towards supply chain product-harm crises and
subsequent product recalls, investigating whether the stock market
would react differently depending on the recall strategy followed
by affected companies in announcing the recall.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The literature
is reviewed and the hypotheses are developed in Section 2. The
research methodology and data analyses are described in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Concluding remarks and
suggestions for further research are presented in Section 5.2. Theoretical background and research hypotheses
2.1. Financial impact of a product recall
A product recall, like other types of negative publicity, can
severely damage a ﬁrm’s image, and even worse, destroy inves-
tors’ conﬁdence, which will be reﬂected in the decline of its stock
price. Although the long-term damage to brand equity and
company reputation associated with a product recall may be
difﬁcult, if not impossible, to quantify, the short-term impact on
shareholders’ wealth is readily estimable through the use of event
study methodology, based on daily stock prices. Event study
methodology is a well-established approach that has been used
in numerous academic papers to measure the ﬁnancial impact of
unanticipated corporate events, such as supply chain glitches
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2003), and the announcement of quality
award winners (Wright et al., 1995), ISO9000 (Lo et al., 2009).
Prior researchers have examined the short-term effects of a
product recall announcement on the stock prices of affected
companies, based on product recalls in the United States (Jarrell
and Peltzman, 1985; Pruitt and Peterson, 1986; Hoffer et al., 1988;
Bromiley and Marcus, 1989; Davidson and Worrell, 1992; Thomsen
and McKenzie, 2001; Govindaraj et al., 2004; Chu et al., 2005;
Cheah et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009). These studies have revealed
that, in general, a signiﬁcant decline in stock price followed a
product recall announcement. For example, Jarrell and Peltzman
(1985) found that the shareholders of ﬁrms producing recalled
drugs and automobiles bore ﬁnancial losses that exceeded the
direct costs of recalling the defective products. Much of the prior
research on the stock market reaction to a product recall announce-
ment has focused on recalls in the automotive industry (Hoffer
et al., 1987; Reilly et al., 1983; Rupp, 2001; Rhee and Haunschild,2006; Haunschild and Rhee, 2004), however, other notable studies
have focused on pharmaceuticals (Dowdell et al., 1992) and tires
(Govindaraj et al., 2004). Hendricks and Singhal (2003) studied the
effect on stock price associated with supply chain disruptions, in
general, which included product recalls across industry types as one
type of supply chain disruption.
There has been some debate in previous event studies about the
size of the stock market reaction to a product recall announcement.
Hoffer et al. (1988) found ‘‘little evidence’’ of a signiﬁcant effect for
a recall ﬁrm, after correcting some methodological problems and
reclassifying and reanalyzing Jarrell and Peltzman’s (1985) data for
the 1975–1981 period. Bromiley and Marcus (1989) found that the
negative stock market reaction to defective automobile recalls was
too small to prevent producers from providing defective automo-
biles, compared to the expected potential gains from providing
these defective products.
As a baseline, we propose:
H1: A product recall announcement is associated with a negative
abnormal return on stock price.
2.2. Signaling effect of recall strategy
Investors may react differently to news of the discovery of a
product hazard, depending on the actions and strategies followed by
the responsible companies. Beyond the publicly available informa-
tion contained in the recall announcement, companies take different
actions, in terms of when to announce a recall and how to handle it.
For example, Siomkos and Kurzbard (1994) divided company
responses to a product hazard into four categories: denial, involun-
tary recall, voluntary recall and super-effort, comprising the ‘‘com-
pany response continuum.’’ It is important to understand consumer
and market reactions to different recall strategies, in order to
effectively craft a suitable recall strategy to mitigate the potential
negative effects of a product recall announcement (Siomkos and
Kurzbard, 1994; Rupp, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2009).
Researchers have argued that the stock market reaction to a
product recall announcement may vary considerably, depending
on the information content of the recall announcement. This is
supported by signaling theory (Connelly et al, 2011), which posits
that the market interprets an event in terms of the signal that it
sends about the quality of a good or service. Buyers and sellers
possess asymmetric information about product quality for items
that are high in experience qualities; the quality of an item that is
high in experience qualities can only be evaluated after it has
been purchased and consumed. In the absence of complete
information about product quality (Boulding and Kirmani,
1993), consumers form their own ‘‘intuitive theories’’ (Wright,
1986, p.1) about the quality of a product they are considering
purchasing. In order to send a high quality message about their
products, sellers may rely on signals such as price (Zeithaml,
1988), advertising (Kirmani, 1990; Kirmani and Wright, 1989) or
warranties (Kelley, 1988; Wiener, 1985). Based on such signals,
consumers form their impressions of the quality of the products
that are offered (Beales et al., 1981), prior to purchase.
In the case of a product hazard, the sellers may know about the
existence of the hazard, as well as its severity and pervasiveness,
but potential buyers do not. A seller which has discovered a minor,
non-pervasive product defect may be motivated to accurately
inform potential buyers about it, so that it can appropriately
compensate the buyers. Thus, buyers may interpret a proactive
recall announcement as a signal of a minor, non-pervasive hazard.
In contrast, a seller which has discovered a serious, pervasive
product defect may prefer to deceive the buyer about the unob-
served quality of the product, in order to capture undeserved
returns in the marketplace. Because of the pervasiveness or severity
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replace all of the defective items, thus it would avoid a proactive
recall announcement, only recalling its products if forced to do so
by a government agency. Thus, consumers and the market may
interpret a proactive recall strategy as the signal of a minor, non-
pervasive defect, while a passive recall strategy may be interpreted
as signaling a serious, pervasive and costly defect, which will have
serious implications for the seller’s future revenue stream.
The empirical evidence about the signaling effect of proactive
versus passive recall announcements is mixed, and there are two
schools of thought about the meaning of the signal that a
proactive recall announcement sends. Rupp (2001) divided recall
strategies into government-initiated and manufacturer-initiated
recalls, with ﬁndings that supported the notion that different
product recall strategies have differing impacts. Davidson and
Worrell (1992) found that more signiﬁcantly negative abnormal
returns were strongly associated with recall announcements for
replacing or returning purchases, compared with announcements
of recalls for repair or checking of products. Similarly, Thomsen
and McKenzie (2001) found that recalls for products with a more
serious hazard were associated with signiﬁcant negative losses,
while recalls for products with a less serious hazard had
no negative impact. Davidson and Worrell (1992) found that
government-ordered recalls were associated with greater losses
in shareholder value than voluntary recalls.
However, Chen et al. (2009) found that a proactive product recall
announcement made before a required recall by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission had a more negative effect on a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial value, when compared to passive strategies. They inter-
preted this as investors perceiving a proactive strategy as a signal of
larger impending ﬁnancial losses to the ﬁrm, rather than signaling a
minor hazard or socially responsible actions by the ﬁrm. Similarly,
Rupp (2001) found that recalls initiated by the government were
not found to be associated with greater shareholder losses.
There are also corporate social responsibility implications of
employing a proactive versus passive recall strategy. Jolly and
Mowen (1984) indicated that a company is perceived to be more
responsible if it acts before a government agency steps in and orders
it to take action. By issuing a proactive recall, the company sends a
signal that it sincerely cares about the health and safety of its
customers, and that these concerns are more important to it than
any revenue implications associated with recalling hazardous pro-
ducts. Hence, people may perceive a recall announcement as a signal
of socially responsible actions to proactively prevent potential
hazards, rather than potentially leading to substantial ﬁnancial losses
for involved companies (Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007). Many U.S.
product recall announcements are made before there are any reports
of accidents or injuries. Thus, people in the U.S. may perceive a
proactive product recall as a signal of a ﬁrm’s diligence in attending
to quality issues and believe that socially responsible ﬁrms are more
likely to produce high-quality products (Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007).
This enhances consumers’ conﬁdence in the ﬁrm’s products and
results in an increase in future sales and revenue, which helps to
relieve the negative impact of the stock market reaction to a product
recall announcement (Siomkos and Kurzbard, 1994; Margolis et al.,
2007).
Thus, we hypothesize:
H2: A passive product recall strategy will be associated with a
more negative standardized abnormal return than a proactive
product recall strategy.
2.3. Effect of industry
Another important issue in the study of product recalls is
whether there are differences by industry in product recallstrategies and their impact on shareholder wealth. Pruitt and
Peterson (1986) found a signiﬁcant negative ﬁnancial impact of
non-automobile product recalls on the equity holders of affected
ﬁrms. Chu et al. (2005) studied the impact of security price
reactions to product recalls in a different time period from that
of Pruitt and Peterson (1986), ﬁnding that the drug and cosmetics
industries suffered more, while the rubber and automotive
industries were less affected.
In order to study potential industry differences, we focus on
the automobile and food industries, which have very different
characteristics. The automobile industry has been extensively
studied in the prior literature on product recalls, which is based
in the U.S. Automobiles are a considered to be luxury good in
China, where only 38 of every 1000 people owned automobiles
in 2008, compared with 500 of every 1000 people in developed
countries (http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2009-03/06/content_
10956617.htm). The Chinese automobile industry is comprised of
a few large automakers, which produce cars in high volumes on
assembly lines. Many Chinese automobile companies cooperate
with foreign companies. For example, First Automotive Group
Corporation has cooperative relationships with international
leaders such as Volkswagen AG, Toyota and Mazda, and Chana
Auto Co. Ltd. has joint venture relationships with Ford, Mazda and
Suzuki. In contrast, the food industry is broad, encompassing the
agriculture, manufacturing and service industries. It contains long
supply chains, from farming to processing and sales.
We expect that there will be fundamental differences in
product recall strategies and their effect between companies in
the automobile and food industries in China, for several reasons.
First, the Chinese automobile industry has more experience with
product recalls. Because recall systems have existed in the
Chinese automotive industry since 2004, systems for managing
automobile product recalls are more mature than they are in
other industries in China. Government legislation, joint ventures
with international partners and promotion have caused more
automobile companies follow proactive recall strategies; govern-
ment regulation is one of the most important driving forces for
coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Ketokivi and
Schroeder, 2004; McFarland et al., 2008). In contrast, recall
systems for food recalls in China were not set up until 2007.
The systems are much less mature, leading to food recalls tending
to be issued only when there are consumer complaints or
incidents (passive recalls). Previous recalls for food products in
China have always been in response to health-related incidents.
Second, food is ubiquitous. Because food is a necessity, rather
than a luxury, everyone is affected by defective food products.
While defective food products can lead to serious and immediate
health issues, defective automotive parts seldom do. In addition,
food products are much less associated with brand than auto-
mobiles are. For example, in the recent recalls of contaminated
raw spinach in the US, consumers found it very difﬁcult to
identify the supplier of their spinach, which resulted in an overall
boycott of all raw spinach. Even for branded products like baby
formula, consumers cannot readily identify the farm that supplied
the potentially contaminated raw milk products. In contrast,
during Toyota’s recent quality problems, consumers had no
difﬁculty identifying the affected brand and models and where
they were made.
Third, Chinese automobile companies are more aware of
the potential impact of a product hazard than food companies,
because of their strong relationships with foreign manufacturers.
Firms which are embedded in social networks are inclined to
imitate the behaviors of other network members (Henisz and
Delios, 2001; McFarland et al., 2008). Due to mimetic isomorph-
ism, ﬁrms not only imitate the organizations they perceive as
successful in their industry, but they are also more likely to
1 The twenty recall announcements in automobile industry were announced
by eight different ﬁrms. Five of these eight different ﬁrms announced more than
one recalls. For each distinct ﬁrm, if there are multiple recall announcements in
the same year, we only use the ﬁrst recall announcements.
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(Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Lo et al., 2011). Thus,
Chinese automobile companies have learned a lot from the
leading international automobile companies that they have rela-
tionships with, including corporate social responsibility for proac-
tively dealing with product hazards. In contrast, Chinese food
companies are much more local and regional in focus, tending to
both purchase supplies and distribute products exclusively in
China. They are less aware of the potential impact of a product
hazard due to defective food products.
Fourth, structural differences between the automobile and
food industries are associated with differences in strategies for
dealing with product hazards. Entry barriers are relatively high
in the automotive industry (http://report.cei.gov.cn/doc/zh14/
2005012024341.pdf). Automobile companies are large, and
their ‘‘suppliers (are) bigger and have more resources,yand
the supply-network structurey take (s) on a more formalized
face that comes with the more standardized conﬁgurations of
the work procedures of ERP (Choi and Hong, 2002, pg. 490).’’ In
addition, automobiles are discrete products, and each auto-
mobile has a unique identiﬁcation number (VIN), making it
potentially easier to recall particular automobiles and to
identify the speciﬁc automobile that contains a hazardous
component. Because of their sophisticated information sys-
tems and discrete, uniquely identiﬁable products, it is rela-
tively easy for automobile companies to develop and use
systems for defect traceability and process control. Thus, we
propose that automobile companies are more willing to
employ proactive recall strategies.
However, the situation in the food industry is quite different.
There are many tiers in food production supply chains ‘‘from farm
to fork,’’ and the barriers to entry by farmers are quite low. For
example, batches of raw milk produced by dairy farmers with
different quality attributes are often mixed together in milk
collection stations, which increases the complexity of tracing
back to the source (Wang et al., 2009, 2010), and milk is typically
monitored in batches, instead of as uniquely identiﬁed items
(Jansen-Vullers et al., 2003). Hence, when a hazardous food
product is discovered, it is very difﬁcult to ‘‘trace and follow
food, feed and ingredients through all stages of production,
processing and distribution’’ (Wang et al., 2009, pg. 2866), which
potentially increases the number of recalled products. This makes
it very difﬁcult or impossible to track and trace back to the source
of the problem (Tse and Tan, 2012), especially those rawmaterials
bought from spot market (Han et al., 2011). For example, in the
2008 melamine-tainted milk crisis in China, more than 70% of raw
milk was provided by small-scale farmers, some of whom were as
small as owning a single cow, who were scattered across the
country, and gathered through independent milk collection sta-
tions (http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-03/23/con
tent_11059245.htm). Many small dairy farmers in China are
illiterate and do not keep feed, medication and yield records for
individual cattle. Because the raw milk provided by the individual
farmers had been intermingled in the collection station vats, it
was impossible to identify the source of the contaminated raw
milk. Because of such difﬁculties, the Chinese food industry is
reluctant to employ proactive recalls.
H3: There are differences between industries in the use of
proactive versus passive product recall strategies.
We also hypothesize recalls in the food industry have a greater
negative impact on public perceptions of a ﬁrm, for many of the
reasons listed above. Food recalls are perceived as being more
serious ﬁnancial events because of the ubiquitous nature of food,
difﬁculties in tracing defects to their source and the fact thatChinese food product recalls have always been in response to
illness reports. These signal more serious ﬁnancial repercussions
for the food products producers. For example, after the 2008
melamine-tainted milk crisis, many Chinese people stopped
purchasing all Chinese dairy products.
In contrast, the impact of an automobile recall in China will
not be as large as that of a food recall. Because cars are
considered a luxury item, many Chinese people do not own a
car, although they all eat food. Because many Chinese auto-
mobile recalls are made before there has been an accident or
injury, people interpret automotive recalls as a signal of
socially responsible action and automakers’ diligence in
attending to quality issues, rather than as a signal of impend-
ing ﬁnancial losses, which mitigates the negative conse-
quences by stock returns on product recalls. Hence, investors
perceive a food product recall as a more serious signal of
impending ﬁnancial loss for the affected ﬁrm, compared with
an automobile recall.H4: A product recall announcement in the food industry will be
associated with a more negative standardized abnormal return
than one in the automotive industry.3. Methodology
3.1. Data
We selected product recall announcements for companies
whose common stock was listed on either the Shenzhen A Share
Stock Exchange or the Shanghai A Share Stock Exchange. We
searched for product recall announcements from several sources,
using ‘‘recall,’’ ‘‘return,’’ ‘‘replace’’ and ‘‘take off the shelf’’ as key
words. The sources included four Chinese major security news-
papers, including China Security Journal, Shanghai Securities News,
Securities Daily and Secutimes, which have been designated by the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to release news
about Chinese listed companies. We also collected product recall
announcements from the China Infobank database (http://www.
infobank.cn/), which houses basic materials, important decisions,
announcements and reports about Chinese companies listed in
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange from
1993 to the present, and the website www.cninfo.com.cn, which
is the ofﬁcial website designated by the CSRC to release news
about Chinese publicly listed companies. A third source was the
Chinese automobile recall website (http://www.qiche365.org.cn/),
which was set up to release automobile recall news, as part of the
automobile recall system established by the Chinese government
in 2004.
There were a total of 42 product recall announcements cover-
ing the ten year period from 2002 (the ﬁrst product recall for a
Chinese publically traded company) to March of 2011, among
which twenty announcements were in the automobile industry1,
eleven were in the pharmaceutical industry, six were in the food
industry and ﬁve were in the electronics industry. Table 1
provides examples of some representative cases. The year and
industry distribution of the 42 recall announcements are shown
in Fig. 1, and descriptive statistics are contained in Table 2. We
used the data for the most recent ﬁscal year completed before the
release of the product recall announcement.
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Fig. 1. Year and industry distribution of Chinese recall announcements.
Table 1
Representative product recall announcements in China.
Industry Company Year Description
Automobile FAW Car Co., Ltd. 2004 First recall in the Chinese automobile industry since the Chinese government released its ‘‘Defective
Automobile Product Recall Regulations’’ in 2004. It recalled all Mazda6 produced before March 25, 2004
because the design for the gap between the insulation device of the fuel tank and the exhaust pipe were not
large enough, hence might cause the fuel tank to be out of shape or melt.
Dongfeng Automobile Co., Ltd 2007 Recall of the cars produced from during Sept. 7 to Sept. 21 because of the a potential risk that the brake ﬂuid
might ooze and inﬂuence the braking effect.
Food Yili Industrial Group Co., Ltd. 2008 Recall of tainted produced milk powder and liquid milk products that used the industrial chemical
melamine to artiﬁcially increase the protein level, after Chinese authorities reported the inspection results.
Melamine-tainted milk products can be fatal for humans.
Shuanghui Investment &
Development Co., Ltd.
2011 Recall of tainted pork products contaminated with an illegal animal feed additive Clenbuterol, better known
as ‘‘lean meat powder’’ to artiﬁcially lower the fat content. This is banned as a food additive because it can be
fatal for humans.
Electronics Elec-Tech International Co.,
Ltd
2005 Recall of juicers sold by Applica Consumer Products Inc. in the U.S. market. There was a potential risk that
the blade might be broken as the juicer operated, with the result that there could be accidents that cause
serious harm to the consumers as they drink the juice containing the broken blades.
Tsinghua Tongfang Co., Ltd 2002 Recall of defective repeaters. This announcement initiated recall systems in the electronics products of this
brand, which was the ﬁrst recall in Chinese electronics industry.
Pharmaceuticals Yabao Pharmaceutical Group
Co., Ltd.
2007 Recall and destroy the ‘‘Alginic sodium diester injection,’’ according to ‘‘Good Manufacturing Practice’’.
Taiji Industry Company Ltd. 2010 Recall one kind of slimming products named ‘‘Qumei’’ that contained the banned Sibutramine ingredient,
which can cause cardiovascular and cerebrovascular diseases in humans.
Table 2
Sample demographics.
Measure Mean Median Std. dev. Maximum Minimum
Sales (million RMB) 7420.61 3910.79 8609.81 36749.34 35.5
Total assets
(million RMB)
6382.61 4201.15 6140.4 24471.42 134.46
Net proﬁt
(million RMB)
235.11 81.14 398.26 1450.68 587.6
Employees 6341 5053 6861 40231 110
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We used event study methodology, based on daily security
prices, to estimate the impact of a product recall announcement on
shareholder wealth. Event study method is ‘‘a powerful tool that
can help researchers assess the ﬁnancial impact of changes in
corporate policy (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997, pg. 626)’’. Using this
method, we can determine whether there was an abnormal return
on the security associated with an unanticipated event, such as a
product recall announcement. We employed the following steps:
Step 1: Obtain the estimated parameters for computing the
expected normal return of stock i on day t.
There are three ways to estimate normal returns, including
mean-adjusted, market-adjusted and market model measures.
We use the market model to estimate the normal returns
associated with product recall announcements on shareholder
wealth, in order to isolate the impact of market-related factors
and control systematic risk (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003;
Govindaraj et al., 2004). The market model uses the following
equation as the basic framework for expressing the relationshipbetween a ﬁrm’s stock return and the market return:
Rit ¼ aiþbi  Rmtþeit ð1Þ
where Rit is the actual return of stock i on each day t of
estimation period ½t0,t1, Rmt is the return of market portfolio
(such as Shanghai Composite Index or Shenzhen Composite
Index) on each day t of estimation period ½t0,t1, ai is the
intercept of the relationship for stock i, bi is the slope of the
relationship of stock iwith the market return, and eit is the error
item with Exp eitð Þ ¼ 0, Var eitð Þ ¼ S2i .
We estimated ai, bi and S
2
i through the use of ordinary least
squares (OLS), over an estimation period of 120 trading days. We
set the day of the product recall announcement to be day 0 and,
consistent with most event studies, we used a 2-day event
period, including both day 0 and day 1, to control for confound-
ing effects (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). The estimation period
ended ten trading days before the recall announcement, that is,
the estimation period was day (130, 11), in order to separate
the estimation period and the event period, so as to isolate the
impact of the event and prevent any potential bias (Hendricks
and Singhal, 2003).
Step 2: Compute the normal return of stock i on each day t
of the event period.
We used the estimates ai, bi and S
2
i , obtained in step 1, to
compute the normal return of stock i on each day t of the event
period.
E Ritð Þ ¼ aiþbi  Rmt ð2Þ
Step 3: Compute the abnormal return (AR) of stock i on
each day t of the event period.
The abnormal return measures the impact of the unanticipated
information release on the security price. We derived esti-
mates of the daily abnormal return (AR) for the ith company as
Table 3
Event study results.
Day Abnormal return Cumulative abnormal return
Mean Median (%) Negative Mean Median (%) Negative
5 0.12% (0.68) 0.77% (0.857) 57.14% (0.926) – – –
4 0.63% (1.33) 0.25% (1.358) 42.86% (0.926) – – –
3 0.40% (0.88) 0.19% (0.644) 52.38% (0.309) – – –
2 0.38% (0.87) 0.24% (0.600) 47.62% (0.309) – – –
1 0.21% (0.57) 0.59% (0.275) 52.38% (0.309) – – –
0 0.31% (0.84) 0.01% (0.724) 53.85% (0.480) 0.31% (0.84) 0.01% (0.724) 53.85% (0.480)
1 2.21% (5.21nnn) 1.52% (3.964nnn) 78.57% (3.703nnn) 2.52% (4.404nnn) 2.14% (3.409nnn) 73.81% (3.086nnn)
Note: t-statistic for the mean abnormal return, Wilcoxon signed-rank test Z-statistic for the median abnormal return, and binomial sign test Z-statistic for the percent
negative abnormal return are reported in parentheses.
npo .10, nnpo .05, nnnpo .01.
X. Zhao et al. / Int. J. Production Economics 142 (2013) 115–123120the difference between the actual return of stock i on day t
and the estimated normal return of stock i on day t, which is
expressed as:
ARit ¼ Ritaibi  Rmt ð3Þ
The standardized abnormal return (SAR) is calculated as:
SARit ¼ ARit=SDit ð4Þ
where SDit ¼ fS2i  ½1þ 1=T
 þ RmtRmð Þ2=PTt ¼ 1 RmtRmð Þ2g
0:5
,
T is the sum of days during estimation period, Rm is the
average return of market portfolio during estimation period.
The daily average abnormal return for all the sample compa-
nies on day t is:
AARt ¼
XN
i ¼ 1
ARit=N ð5Þ
where N is the number of sample companies on day t.
We used a t-test to test the statistical signiﬁcance of the
average abnormal return:
t¼
XN
i ¼ 1
ARit=SDitﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ð6Þ
Step 4: Compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of
stock i in the event period ½t1,t2.
The abnormal returns are then cumulated over the number of
event days to get a measure of the cumulative abnormal return
for each company.
CARt t1,t2ð Þ ¼
Xt2
t ¼ t1
ARit ð7Þ
Step 5: Compute the average cumulative abnormal return
(ACAR) of the sample ﬁrms in the event period ½t1,t2.
ACARt t1,t2ð Þ ¼
1
N
XN
i ¼ 1
CARi t1,t2ð Þ ð8Þ
We used a t-test to test the statistical signiﬁcance of the
average cumulative abnormal return:
t¼
XN
i ¼ 1
Pt ¼ t2
t ¼ t1 CARit=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPt ¼ t2
t ¼ t1 SD
2
it
q
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ð9Þ4. Results and discussions
4.1. Financial implications of a product recall
Table 3 contains the event study results. It reveals that, on the
announcement day (Day 0), there was a mean abnormal return of
0.31%, which was not statistically different from 0. There werealso no statistically signiﬁcant results for the median abnormal
return and percentage of negative abnormal returns on Day 0.
However, a signiﬁcant impact was found on the day following the
announcement day (Day 1).
The mean abnormal return on Day 1 was 2.21%, the median
abnormal return was 1.52% and the percentage of negative
abnormal return was 78.57%. All of the statistics in parentheses
indicate that the probability of obtaining a negative abnormal
return by chance on Day 1 is less than 1%. On the days before the
announcement day (Day 5 to Day 1), the abnormal returns
varied without statistical signiﬁcance, driven by chance rather
than economic factors (Wright et al., 1995). This suggests that the
negative abnormal returns on Day 1 should be attributed to the
recall announcement, which was unanticipated by the stock
market, and that the product recall announcements were asso-
ciated with a negative stock price change. This indicates that
investors perceive a product recall announcement as a signal of
product hazard and impending ﬁnancial losses for the ﬁrm. The
cumulative abnormal returns provide further conﬁrmation to this
ﬁnding. Thus, H1 was supported.
4.2. Comparison with product recall studies in the United States
Table 4 summarizes the existing event study literature on the
stock market reaction to a product recall announcement in the
United States market. Comparing Tables 3 and 4, we can see that
recall announcements in China are related to greater ﬁnancial
losses in stock price, compared with recall announcements in the
United States. The average abnormal return is less than 1% in
most U.S. studies, while the mean abnormal return in Chinese
markets was 2.21%.
This research provides the opportunity to study recall systems
that are in their infancy. The ﬁrst recall system established in
China was in 2004 in the automobile industry, and recall systems
for automobiles have developed to the point that there is now an
ofﬁcial website to release real-time automobile recall announce-
ments. However, recall systems in the food, drug, toy and
electronics products industries were not developed until 2007,
and there are no ofﬁcial websites that release real-time recall
announcements for these products to the public, as there are in
the United States.
In contrast, in the United States, ﬁve federal agencies are
responsible for product recalls: the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the National High-
way Trafﬁc Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Economic
Protection Agency (EPA). The ﬁrst product recall occurred in 1966,
thus, U.S. recall systems are much more mature than Chinese
recall systems. U.S. consumers are constantly exposed to recall
announcements, many of them for very minor hazards, while a
Table 5
Mean standardized abnormal returns (SAR) on day 1 by recall
strategy.
Recall strategy Mean SAR on Day 1
Proactive (N¼19) 0.446n
Passive (N¼23) 1.100nnn
npo .10, nnpo .05, nnnpo .01.
Table 4
Event study results in the prior literature on US product recall announcements.
Author Analysis period Sample size Industry Abnormal return on day -1 Abnormal return on day 0
Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), 1967–1981 116 Automobile 0.81%nnn (1,1) –
Pruitt and Peterson (1986) 1968–1983 156 Non-automobile 0.4%nnn 0.363%nnn
Hoffer, et al. (1987) 1970–1984 46 Automobile 0.565%nnn 0.093%
Bromiley and Marcus (1989) 1967–1983 119 Automobile 0.32%n 0.32%n
Davidson and Worrell (1992) 1968–1987 133 Non-automobile 0.36%nnn 0.12%
Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) 1992–1998 252 (class 1) 189 (class 2) Meat and poultry – 0.4%nn(class 1) 0.2% (class 2)
Chu et al. (2005) 1984–2003 269 Non-automobile 1.1% nnn 0.6%n
Chen et al. (2009) 1996–2007 24 (proactive) 65 (passive) Consumer products – 0.6%nn (proactive) 0.38% (passive)
Note: most previous studies of product recalls in the US found that there were signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns on Day -1, and some found signiﬁcant negative
abnormal returns on Day 0. In the case of China, however, we only found signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns on Day 1, not on Day 0. The reason for this may be that
previous studies set Day 0 to be theWall Street Journal (WSJ) product recall announcement date. However, recall announcements are released to public by ofﬁcial websites
on the day prior to their publication inWSJ, that is, Day -1. Therefore, investors would be expected to react on event Day -1 or on Day 0, in cases where the announcements
are released near, or after the stock market close on Day -1.
npo .10, nnpo .05, nnnpo .01.
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China. Thus, recalls in the U.S. may not have as a negative impact
on stock price as product recalls in China do.
During 2007 and 2008, it seemed there were new stories about
defective products and recalls almost every day in the United
States, mostly leading back to Chinese facilities (Lyles et al.,
2008). However, the situation was very different in China, with
very little news about product recalls. For example, on March 12,
2009, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s FSIS released a CLASS II
recall announcement for chicken drink products manufactured by
Khong Guan Corporation for products that did not meet poultry
products inspection or poultry exemption requirements, even
though no illnesses had been reported (http://www.fsis.usda.gov/
News_&_Events/Recall_009_2009_Release/index.asp). However, the
products of Khong Guan Corporation were not taken off the shelves
in China because the problem was perceived as minor. Hence, when
there is a product recall announcement released in China, people
assume that there must be a severe product hazard and that there
will be great ﬁnancial losses to the company.
4.3. Signaling effect of recall strategy
Similar to Chen et al. (2009) study, we deﬁned a proactive recall
as a recall initiated by a ﬁrm which found the potential defect itself
and initiated a product recall action before any complaints or
incidents were reported by consumers or orders from a related
government agency. Otherwise, we deﬁned the recall strategy as
passive.
When we traced back through the prior product recall
announcements in China, we found that most recalls in the
automobile industry followed a proactive recall strategy, while all
of the recalls in the other industries followed a passive strategy.
This is probably due to a combination of mimetic isomorphism of
foreign automakers that are perceived as successful and coercive
isomorphism, due to tight government scrutiny of the automotive
industry. Thus, H3 was supported.
Tables 5 and Fig. 2 show that the results for the stock market
reaction to different recall strategies. We compared the standardized
abnormal returns of different recall strategies on Day 1 by conduct-
ing an independent-samples t-test, which revealed that the negative
standardized abnormal returns for a proactive recall strategy were
less than those for a passive recall strategy (po0.1). Thus, the stock
market reacted more negatively to passive recall strategy, compared
to a proactive recall strategy, supporting H2.
This result is the opposite of Chen et al.’ (2009) ﬁnding that a
proactive strategy had a more negative effect on ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
value than a passive strategy, based on a sample of U.S. product
recall announcements. They proposed that a proactive recallstrategy would receive greater attention from investors, which
the stock market will interpret as a signal of a severe product
hazard and impending ﬁnancial damage to the ﬁrm. However, in
the Chinese context, investors perceive companies following a
proactive recall strategy as more socially responsible and with
better internal quality assurance systems. Moreover, consumers
and the market may interpret a passive recall strategy as signal-
ing a serious, pervasive and costly defect, hence the involved
ﬁrms would only recall products when required to, such as the
ﬁrms involved with the melamine-tainted milk products and lean
meat powder tainted pork products shown in Table 1. A proactive
recall strategy, on the other hand, may be viewed as a signal of a
minor, non-pervasive defect with only minor potential damage to
the seller’s future revenue streams, such as the recall cases in the
automobile industry shown in Table 1.
4.4. Effect of industry
Table 6 lists the mean standardized abnormal returns (SAR)
on Day 1 for different industries. We compared the standardized
abnormal returns on Day 1 for the food and automobile industries
by conducting an independent-samples t-test. The negative stan-
dardized abnormal returns for automobile industry recalls were
less than those for food industry recall announcements (po0.05).
This indicates that the food industry suffered a more severe
stock market effect of a product recall announcement, while the
Table 6
Mean standardized abnormal returns (SAR) on day 1 by
industry.
Industry Mean of SAR on Day 1
Automobile (n¼20) 0.515nn
Drugs (n¼11) 0.622nn
Electronics (n¼5) 1.083nn
Food (n¼6) 1.871nnn
npo .10, nnpo .05, nnnpo .01.
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Period
M
ea
n 
SA
R
Automobile industry Food industry All industries
Fig. 3. Mean Standardized Abnormal Returns (SAR) by industry.
X. Zhao et al. / Int. J. Production Economics 142 (2013) 115–123122automobile industry suffered less, supporting H4. In Fig. 3, we can
clearly see the differing impact of product recalls in the food and
automobile industries. Following Day 0, the abnormal returns for
the food industry dropped more sharply than they did for the
automotive industry. Furthermore, while the abnormal returns
recovered quickly for the automotive industry, they continued to
decline, in the short run, for the food industry.5. Conclusions
This study investigates the stock market reaction to product
recall announcements in China, providing the opportunity to
study recall systems that are in their infancy. Based on a sample
of product recall announcements made during the period from
2002 to the March of 2011, we found signiﬁcant negative
abnormal returns on the day following a product recall announce-
ment. This indicates that the Chinese stock market reacts quickly
and efﬁciently to recall announcements. This ﬁnding is congruent
with ﬁndings about product recall announcements in the United
States. Our ﬁndings further reveal, however, that the negative
abnormal return in the China market is generally larger than that
in the United States market. Differences in recall systems and
recall actions between the United States and China provide a
possible explanation for the results.
Our results also reveal that companies in the food industry
experience a more severe reaction to a product recall announce-
ment and that food product recalls in China only take place when
there have been consumer illnesses. Thus, companies in the food
industry are more likely to employ a passive recall strategy. In
contrast, Chinese companies in the automobile industry experi-
enced a lower stock price reaction to a product recall announce-
ment. Automobiles are more frequently recalled, even when there
have been no accidents, which means that companies in the
automobile industry are more likely to follow a proactive recall
strategy. Possible explanations for this include differences
between the industries in recall system maturity, relationship
with foreign manufacturers and structural differences between
the industries. In addition, we found that the stock market reacts
more negatively to a passive recall strategy than to a proactive
strategy. This should encourage companies to follow a proactive
product recall strategy and establish systems for mitigating the
negative effects of product-harm crises.A limitation of our study is its relatively small sample size of
42 recall announcements, which is necessary because product
recalls are such a recent and unusual phenomenon in China. The
sample size is further limited because many product recalls
occurred in non-publicly listed companies in China, so market
data is not available. Thus, our sample represents the entire
population of product recall announcements by publicly listed
companies during this time period. In addition, there is somewhat
of a precedent for small sample sizes in the product recall
literature, which is typically due to the small population of
companies of interest. For example, 28 pharmaceutical recall
cases were used by Dowdell et al. (1992) study. Govindaraj
et al. (2004) studied the case of Firestone Tires and the Ford
Explorer product recalls, along with two of Firestone’s competi-
tors and two of Ford’s competitors, to examine the stock market
reaction to announcements by product recall companies and their
competitors. Ten cases in U.K. were used by Cheah et al.’s (2007)
study of the effect of product recall announcements in the
pharmaceuticals industry.
There are a number of interesting directions for future
research that build upon the ﬁndings of this study. First, while
this study addresses product recalls from the shareholders’
perspective, it may also be fruitful to examine this issue from
the consumers’ perspective. Without available secondary data,
however, different methodologies such as experiments and sur-
veys may be necessary to investigate this. Second, some in-depth
matched case studies for the same industries in China and the
United States could be conducted, to assess the reactions by
consumers, the government, and the stock market during a
product harm crisis, exploring the underpinnings of differences
between China and the United States. Finally, research which
works to develop an effective supply chain quality management
system, in order to prevent the recurrence of product recalls, is
becoming increasingly imperative.Acknowledgement
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